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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 1E218

-v-

STEVEN M. JOHNS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilty
rendered on one count of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of
aggravated sexual assault in the Seventh Judicial District Court
in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, Judge.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have his convictions reversed or,
in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 12th day of October, 1977, the prosecutrix
consented to drive her girlfriend of longstanding and her girlfriend's
boyfriend, the appellant, in her pickup truck from Wellington, Utah,
to Woodside, Utah, where the latter were intending to spend the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

night (Tr. 20, 21, 123, 138, 139).

At Woodside, the girlfriend's

mother opposed the appellant's staying overnight and the girlfriend
suggested that the appellant return to Wellington with the
prosecutrix.

Not wishing to cause any difficulty, the appellant

agreed to return, and the proxecutrix consented to give him a ride
back in her truck (Tr. 23, 125, 140).

During the course of their

return, the prosecutrix and the appellant engaged in conversation
which led to sexual ralations (Tr. 23-30, 135, 141-47, 150).

The

couple then drove to Price, Utah, where at the prosecutrix's
request they stopped for a soft drink.

Appellant remained inside

the truck while the prosecutrix entered the store.

While in the

store the prosecutrix reported that she had been raped (Tr. 34, 36,
38, 148).
The appellant was charged with one count of aggravated
kidnapping in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 302(l)(b),
Utah Code Annotated, and with two counts of aggravated sexual
assault in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 405 (l)(a)(ii),
Utah Code Annotated.
During pre-trial conference and in chambers, the
prosecution made a motion in limine to bar the appellant from
introducing evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual
permissiveness and immoral character, evidence as to witnesses'
opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and immoral
character, evidence of che proxecutrix's sexual habits and cuscoms.
and evidence of specific instances of behavior which establish the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs.
no prior notice to the appellant.

The motion was made with

The court granted the motion

and limited the appellant to examination of the prosecutrix's
general reputation in the community (Tr. 3-6).
At trial, because of the motion in limine and fear of
contempt, appellant's counsel was unable to effectively examine
witnesses as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral character; counsel was unable to examine witnesses
as to their opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness
and immoral character; counsel was unable to examine the appellant
as to his opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and
immoral character based upon representations made to him by the
prosecutrix; and counsel was unable to examine the prosecutrix
as to her sexual habits and customs and prior specific instances
which '>·.muld establish said habits and customs.
The jury found the appellant guilty on all three counts
charged.
The appellant retained new counsel and filed his notice
of appeal on December 28, 1978.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR,
UNDER THE CO~ITROLLING DECISIONS OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT, THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND
THE HELL REASONED DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS, IN GRA~ITING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION
IN LD1INE, WHICH DENIED THE APPELLAJ.'lT HIS
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE AS TO THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PROSECUTRIX'S REPUTATION FOR SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS AND IMMORAL CHARACTER; EVIDENCE AS
TO WITNESSES' OPINIONS OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S
SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS AND IMMORAL CHARACTER;
EVIDENCE AS TO THE APPELL}NT'S OPINION OF
THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS AND
IMMORAL CHARACTER BASED UPON PEPRESENTATIONS
MADE TO HIM BY THE PROSECUTRIX; EVIDENCE AS
TO THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL HABITS AND CUSTOMS;
AND EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF BEHAVIOR WHICH ESTABLISH THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL
P~ITS AND CUSTOMS, WHICH EVIDENCE WAS
CRITICAL TO THE ISSUES OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S
CONSENT AND THE APPELLANT'S LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT AS TO ALL COUNTS OF ALLEGED CRIMINAL
CONDUCT.
It should be noted at the outset that while the appellant's
contentions advanced in this brief more directly impact the two counts
of aggravated sexual assault, they impact the single count of
aggravated kidnapping as well.

The single basis for all three counts

is the alleged forced sexual acts (aggravated sexual assault) and
the alleged forced restraint necessitated therefor (aggravated
kidnapping).

Thus, the points contended for here, which raise the

issues of consent and lack of criminal intent, go both to the
prosecutrix's willingness to engage in sexual acts -- therefore no
aggravated sexual assault

and, due to this willingness, an absencE

of forced restraint -- therefore no aggravated kidnapping.
The factual focal point involved in the instant case is
whether the sexual acts engaged in by the prosecutrix and the
appellant were forced or consensual.

The appellant contends as his

defense that they were in fact consensual.
In order to

~aintain

this defense at trial,

i~

~as

neces-

sary that the appellant be gi~en the oooort~ni:~ to i~croduce all
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evidence relevant and material to the issue of the proxecutrix's
consent, including evidence as to the proxecutrix's reputation for

l

sexual permissiveness and immoral character, evidence as to witnesses' opinions of the prosecutirx's sexual permissiveness and
immoral character, evidence of the prosecutrix's sexual habits and
customs, and evidence of specific instances of behavior which establish said habits and customs.

This opportunity was severely

limited, if not entirely thwarted, by the trial court's granting of
the prosecution's motion in limine restricting the appellant's scope
of examination to what the trial court referred to as the prosecutrix's
"general reputation in the community." (Tr. 5)

As a direct conse-

quence of this ruling, the appellant was effectively deprived of
his defense.
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975), is the leading
Utah case in this area.

There the Utah Supreme Court was presented

with a factual situation involving an allegation of rape analogous
to the instant case.

The court found, as is the case here, that the

association between the parties involved came about in a sociable
and peaceable manner, so that there was a genuine and critical issue
as to whether the sexual relations had been consented to.

The court

then said:
It is in such instances that the
value of the victim's reputation
moral character is sufficient to
the negative factors and justify
mission of such evidence. at p.

probative
as to
outweigh
the ad470

The court based its conclusion in part on the Utah Rules
of Evidence,
4 7 provides:
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. . . when a trait of a person's character
is relevant as tending to prove his conduct
on a specified occasion, such trait may be
~roved in the same manner as provided b*
ule 46 . . . (Emphasis added:) at p.70

As the court further stated, Rule 46 allows for the proof of such
a trait by evidence of reputation.

Although not directly in issue

in Howard and therefore not addressed by the court, Rule 46 also
allows for evidence in the form of opinion to prove such a trait.
Thus, under the Howard rationale, where consent to sexual relations
is at issue in a sexual assault case, both evidence as to the prosecutrix's

reputation for sexual morality and evidence in the form

of opinion as to the prosecutrix's sexual morality is admissible.
As for the admissibility of opinion evidence on the prosecutrix's sexual morality, it should be emphasized that both the
opinions of witnesses and the opinion of the appellant are admissible
Both are of substantial probative value on the issue of the prosecutrix's consent.

In addition, the opinion of the appellant is

of critical importance in determining the appellant's state of mind
during the incidents in question and specifically whether the
appellant had formed the necessary criminal intent.

If, for example.

the prosecutrix made representations to the appellant that gave
the impression that she was sexually permissive and the appellant
formed this opinion of her, the appellant's opinion would be a
critical factor in determining lvhether he reasonab:i.y believed tha:
the prosecutrix was consensually engaging in their subsequent
sexual relations and, thus. whether :he appel:ant lacked the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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necessary criminal intent to compel the prosecutrix's submission
to these relations.
The Utah Supreme Court, in dictum in the Howard case,
also referred to the admissibility of specific acts of the prosecutrix.

The court stated:
. though it is not proper to permit
inquiry into specific acts of prior
misconduct of the victim, where the
critical issue is consent, and the circumstances are such that it reasonably
appears that evidence concerning her
moral character would have sufficient
probative value to outweigh any detrimental aspects of admitting such testimony, it should be admitted.
(Emphasis added.) at p. 469

It is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the court, in saying that
"it should be admitted," is making a reference back to the "specific
acts" of the proxecutrix or a reference generally to "evidence
concerning her moral character."

The appellant suggests that the

Utah Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 49 and 50, support the
reading of the court's language that would admit, under the limited
circumstances specified, evidence of specific acts of the prosecutrix concerning her moral character.
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant
to an issue of behavior on a specified
occasion, but is admissible on that issue
only as tending to prove that the behavior on such occasion conformed to
the habit or custom. (Emphasis added.)
Rule SO provides, in relevant part, that:
..,

-I-
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Evidence of specific instances of behavior is admissible to prove habit
or custom .
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, pursuant to Rule 49, in a sexual assault case, where the issue
is the prosecutrix's consent to sexual relations, evidence of the
prosecutrix's habitual or customary behavior as to sexual relations
should be admissible as tending to prove that the behavior in
question conformed to the habit or custom.

Furthermore, under

Rule 50, evidence of specific instances of behavior should be admis·
sible to establish what the particular habits or customs are.
The appellant contends, in view of the cited language and
rationale of

~oward

and the import of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

that the trial court should have permitted the appellant to examine
witnesses as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral character, examine witnesses as to their opinions
of the proxecutrix's sexual morality, examine the appellant as to
his opinion of the prosecutirx's sexual morality, examine witnesses
and the prosecutrix as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits or customsl
and examine witnesses and the prosecutrix as to specific instances
of behavior establishing said habits or customs.

This contention

also finds support in the case law of other jurisdictions.
In People v. Battilana, 126 P.2d 923 (Calif. 1942), the
California court ruled that:
Evidence of the general reputation of the
rosecutrix for unchastitv to ether with
speci ic acts in proot thereo were com
pent with respect to the two charges of
rape, since the defendant admitted ~aving
had intercourse with her. ~ut asserted
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that she voluntarily submitted to that
relationship. (Citations omitted.)
(Emphasis added.) p. 929
Similarly, in People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82 (Calif. 1958), the
court restated the California position:
. . . if consent is the issue, as it is
in a forcible rape charge, evidence of
prior earticular acts of unchastity is
admiss~ble on the issue of consent.
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
p. 85
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted positions similar to
that in California and that contended for here.

See, District of

Columbia (Matter of JWY, 363 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1976)); Kansas (Interest
of Nichols, 580 P.2d 1370 (Kansas 1978)); Kentucky (Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 208 (Kent. ____ ));Minnesota (State v. Hill,
244 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1976)); Nebraska (State v. Tiff, 260 N.W.2d
296 (Neb. ____ )); New Mexico (State v. Herrera, 582 P.2d 384 (N.M.
1978)); Tennessee (Guy v. State, 443 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1970));
Texas (Burton v. State, 471 S.W.2d 817 (Texas 1971)); and Virginia
(Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Virg. 1978)).
In conclusion, as to Point I, the appellant contends that
the trial court's granting of the prosecution's motion in limine
effectively denied him the opportunity of proving his defense -t~at

the prosecutrix consented and that he lacked the necessary

criminal intent.

The appellant further contends that had any or

all of the evidence of reputation, opinion, habits or customs, and
specific acts been admitted, there is a reasonable likelihood that
the verdict rendered by the jury would have been different and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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the trial court's ruling was, therefore, prejudicial and should
be reversed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ERRONEOUSLY DEFINING AND LIMITING THE SCOPE
OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE, WHICH ERROR EFFECTIVELY
DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE
THE WITNESSES ON THE PROSECUTRIX'S GENERAL
REPUTATION AS TO MORAL CHARACTER.
As stated under Point I, the appellant at trial sought
to prove his defense -- the prosecutrix's consent -- but was met
by the prosecution's motion in limine

which restricted the

appellant's examination to what the trial court characterized as
the prosecutrix's "general reputation in the cotmnunity."

The trial

court, during the course of the trial, enlarged the scope of
"general reputation" to include the prosecutrix's reputation as to
"~exual

morality," but then the court proceeded to erroneously

define and limit the scope of reputation evidence so that the
appellant was effectively denied the opportunity to examine the
witnesses on any aspect of the prosecutrix's reputation.
The following exchange (Tr. 127-129) which took place
during the appellant's counsel's examination of a witness, recapped
in relevant part, contains the trial court's erroneous definition
of and limitation upon the scope of reputation evidence:
Q.

(By Ms. Taylor (appellant's counsel at trial))
Had vou known her and known of her to the
coin~ where vou would be able to make a
I
~taternent \vith re ard co her (the
'
reputation in t e communitv •.-1i::h
co
sexual behavior? (Emphasis added.
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1

THE WITNESS:

Q.

Yes. (Emphasis added.)

(By Ms. Taylor) And would you state
for the jury your knowledge of the
reputation that she does have in the
community with regard to this?
. . . THE COURT: I think we have to
limit it, of course, to the general
reputation of as to chastity and
sexual morality, as I recall -- are
the phrases that are used. So if
you want to rephrase your question
in that regard.

Q.

(By Ms. Taylor) Would you make a
statement with regard to chastity
or her morality?
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

Sexual morality.
Sexual morality.

(Objection by the prosecution for
lack of foundation.)
THE COURT: No. I think we leave it
to cross-examination. We feel there's
enough foundation. I believe she can
give her opinion as to these items.
Q.

(By Ms. Taylor) You do have an opinion?

A.

Yes.
THE COURT: As to general reputation
we're talking about.

Q.

(By Ms. Taylor) We realize it is your
opinion and it is your own. Will you
tell the jury what that is, please?

A.

I'd rather not.

(Emphasis added.)

. HR. BOUTWELL (the prosecutor):
She:s got to give t~e.opinion of
soc~ety,
not er op~n~on.
(Emphasis added.)
THE \HTNESS.

I don't know what the
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opinion of society is.
MR. BOUTWELL: There. That's fine.
I move to strike anything she's
said prior to this in this regard.
THE COURT: The obtection will have
to be sustained, i she doesn't
know what society's opinion is . . .
(Emphasis added.
Thus, after the witness had testified that she could make
a statement as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community
with respect to sexual morality, the trial court, with the help of
the prosecution, erroneously defined and limited the scope of
reputation evidence to "society's opinion."

The witness, clearly

not wanting to testify to her friend's (the prosecutrix's) reputation anyway

as evidenced by her first reply, "I'd rather not"

then said with apparent relief that she did not know what the
"opinion of society" was.

It is obvious that the only explanation

for the witness' sudden change in first saying that she could make
a statement as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community and
later saying that she did not know society's opinion is that the
witness perceived a difference between the community and -the- societ::
as a whole.
It is without question that reputation evidence is not
limited to the "opinion of society."

As Rule 63 of the Utah Rules

of Evidence states, reputation evidence refers to the reputation
the person "in the community in ,...,hich he resides" or the

reputatic~

of the person "in a group with \vhich he habitually associates."
In the instant case. the witness

testi~ied

o:

:hat she was
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able to give the prosecutrix's reputation "in the community"
(Tr. 127) and most likely, as a close friend of the prosecutrix,
the witness would also have been able to give the prosecutrix's
reputation among close friends or "habitual associates."

The

erroneous definition, supplied by the prosecution and given effect
by the trial court, confused the witness by equating the prosecutrix's community with society as a whole, thereby allowing the
witness to escape a difficult situation and not testify to a critical
fact that she was indeed qualified and required to testify to.
Furthermore, the trial court's definition ignored the fact that
reputation evidence may speak to one's reputation in small circles
of friends, precluding the witness from testifying to this form
of reputation.
In conclusion, as to Point II, the appellant contends
that the trial court, in erroneously defining and limiting the
appellant's examination into reputation evidence, committed reversible error as had the reputation evidence concerning the prosecutrix's sexual morality been admitted as the Utah Rules of Evidence
provide, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
rendered a different verdict.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST AND SECOND RULINGS WITH
RESPECT TO THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
CONCERNING THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL MORALITY
•,JERE INCONSISTENT, CAPRICIOUS AND INHERENTLY
UNJUST, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
As referred to in Points I and II, the trial court granted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the prosecution's motion in limine which restricted the scope of
the appellant's examination concerning the prosecutrix's sexual
morality.

A second conference in chambers was held during the

course of the trial wherein the trial court ruled that evidence
of the prosecutrix's predisposition to sodomy may be admitted.
(Tr. 6)

However, the trial court held steadfast to its earlier

granting of the motion in limine and refused admission of similar
evidence tending to show the proxecutrix's proclivities toward
extramarital sexual intercourse or sexual permissiveness in general
Even though the appellant had been charged with both the offense of
forcible sodomy and the offense of forcible sexual intercourse
(in the two counts of aggravated sexual assault), the trial court
elected to treat evidence negating the element of force as to each
offense differently.
The admission of evidence showing a predisposition to
one type of sexual activity while prohibiting the same kind of
evidence as to the other is illogical and inconsistent and further
reflects the trial court's misunderstanding and misapplication of
the law.

The announcement of such a rule is in effect an arbitrary

and capricious interpretation of the Utah Rules of Evidence in
violation of the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24, which
provides:
All laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation.
Clearly, there is no uniformity Hhatsoever in the ::rial court's
allowing evidence negating the force element as to one type of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sexual activity and prohibiting the same evidence as to another
type of sexual activity.
The appellant should have been given the opportunity
to put forth evidence as to the prosecutrix's inclinations to both
types of sexual activity
course.

sodomy and extramarital sexual inter-

The trial court's prohibition as to evidence of the latter,

given its allowance as to evidence of the former, constitutes
reversible error as had the jury been able to hear evidence of
the prosecutrix's predisposition to extramarital sexual intercourse
and sexual permissiveness in general there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have rendered a different verdict finding
the prosecutrix's overall consent to the sexual episode.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE PROSECUTION'S
MOTION IN LIMINE DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSOR.
Through its granting of the proxecution's motion in limine,
the trial court prevented the appellant from presenting crucial
evidence which with reasonable likelihood would have altered the
verdict.

Evidence would have been offered to show the probability

of the prosecutrix's consent, and evidence would have been offered
to show the appellant's lack of criminal intent.

This crucial

deprivation was the equivalent of a denial of appellant's right to
confront his accusor, a right guaranteed by both the Utah and the
United States Constitutions, both explicitly and implicitly, as
part of due process.
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides

that:
In criminal prosecutions
shall have the right . .
in his own behalf, to be
by the witnesses against

the accused
. to testify
confronted
him . . . .

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution mandates
that:
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due
process of law.
Similarly, the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, requires
that in state proceedings:
(t)he accused shall enjoy the
right .
to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .
As the Utah Supreme Court previously stated in State v.
Vasquez, 121 P.2d 903 (Utah, 1942):
The right of confrontation, in a
constitutional or bill of rights
sense, is more than the dictionary
definition, viz., to meet face to
face. A trial is more than a
meeting of a defendant by witnesses
face to face and silently. The
confrontation is the meeting of the
proof or evidence as understood by
the interested parties according to
their understanding. at p. 906
The evidence which appellant was prevented from introducing went to his own understanding of what transpired; it went,
as well, to the issue of the prosecutrix's consent, that is. to
-16-
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the veracity of her testimony.

Addressing the role of evidence,

the Utah Supreme Court has stated in State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d

388 (Utah, 1957):
The function of evidence is to assist
the jury in arriving at the truth,
and if it has any logical tendency to
destroy or support the veracity of the
witness, it is relevant to be considered
as bearing upon his credibility.
at p. 391-392
Hence, following the formulations of the right to confront
one's witnesses as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court and the
role of evidence in general, the appellant was denied his
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
CONCLUSION
As evidence critical to the appellant's defense that the
prosecutrix consented to the sexual relations and that the appellant
lacked the necessary criminal intent, and as evidence whose probative
value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect, the trial
court committed reversible error in denying the appellant his
opportunity to put forth at trial evidence of the prosecutrix's
reputation as to sexual permissiveness and immoral conduct, both in
the community and in small circles of friends, evidence as to
witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and
immoral conduct, evidence of the appellant's opinion of the prosecutrix's habits and customs with respect to sexual behavior, and
evidence of specific instances of behavior which establish said
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habits and customs.

In addition, the trial court committed

r898rsible error in its inconsistent rulings as to the admiss
of evidence negating the element of consent as to the offense
forcible sodomy while refusing the same evidence as to the offense
of forcible sexual intercourse, denying the appellant due
Furthermore, the trial court's rulings effectively denied the
appellant his constitutional right to confront his accuser.
Wherefore, the appellant seeks to have his convictions
reversed or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broad~vay, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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